by Prof. Khurshid Ahmad

CTBT is a proxy and a symbol. The real issue is Pakistan’s sovereignty, Islamic identity and capacity to stand firm for its vital interests. The choice is between Nuclear Deterrence and Economic Self-Reliance on the one hand and submission to US hegemony, compromises on nuclear capability and ever-increasing debt-dependence on the other. CTBT is the gate to the road to nuclear decimation and suffocating debt-enslavement.
The Pakistani nation and its leadership are faced with a critical choice. Whatever direction is taken today will have far-reaching impact on the future of Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah. It is no exaggeration to claim that their role in the 21st century would very much depend on this choice. The Prime Minister’s visit to the United States and his meeting with President Bill Clinton on December 2, 1998, constitute important steps in this process.

The real issue is not one of getting a few billion dollars as loan, and a little more breathing space. Even lifting or partially relaxing of the economic and military sanctions is not the real issue. Similarly, the problem is not to acquire 28 already obsolescent F-16s, or to get back our money, held illegally by the U.S. for the last 8 years after callously defaulting on delivery of contracted F-16s on time. At best, these could be termed as secondary aspects of the problem. The real question is Pakistan’s freedom and security and its capacity and will to stand up for its rights and vital interests. It has implications for Pakistan’s ability and capability to play its role in building and shaping its own future and that of the Muslim Ummah according to its own priorities set in the light of its own ideology, religion, and civilizational and political aspirations. Present and future security challenges in South Asia have to be seen in this context.

Facts have to be faced squarely. Threat from India is a fact, not a fantasy. Despite its large size and population, India remains obsessed with Pakistan and its links with the Islamic Ummah. Although over fifty years have rolled by since independence, Indian political leadership has, by and large, refused to accept Pakistan as a sovereign Muslim country. It remains at war with the two-nation theory, notwithstanding the Indian National Congress’s acceptance of Partition on the basis of this very principle. Whatever the domestic failures of Pakistani leadership, and they were a legion for which our leadership stands guilty, the fact is that the final break-up of Pakistan in 1971 was a result of open Indian aggression. Moreover the Indian leadership sought "legitimacy" for this aggression invoking abhorrence for the two-nation theory and the ideology of Pakistan. Indra Gandhi openly said, India’s defeat of Pakistan on the eastern front was "to sink the two-nation theory in the Bay of Bengal". The world’s response to this naked aggression was passive and even tactically collusive. The same "justification" is advanced by the Indian leadership for its continued occupation of Kashmir, insisting "we do not accept the two-nation theory". Every Indian leadership has been openly declaring: "We are in a state of war against Pakistan and China. For security against these two enemies, nuclear weaponization and all-time war preparations are essential". This was not only declared by the BJP Prime Minister and his Interior Minister, but also very forcefully and in quite clear words by the Indian Government’s think tank, diplomat and spokesman - Mr Jaswant Singh. His article "Against Nuclear Apartheid" appearing in the U.S. journal Foreign Affairs (vol.77, No.5, Sep/Oct,1998) contains a clear statement of the Indian nuclear doctrine.

There is need to understand the U.S. position too. Pakistan never spared anything to avail American friendship and favour. However, starting from the Indo-China war in 1962 to the nuclear explosions in May 1998, the U.S. attitude and the economic and military sanctions to which Pakistan has been subjected in varying degrees and forms, make three things quite clear:

· One, for Pakistan, the U.S. is not at all a trust-worthy friend. It never helped us in real need. It’s promises and pacts of help and protection cannot be relied upon;

· Two, the real U.S. inclination and tilt has always been towards India. At every hour of trial, it upheld Indian interests against Pakistan. In its global political design, U.S. looks towards India as a regional power, even condoning its hegemonistic adventures. It would certainly like to see Pakistan living as a "younger brother" of India. This hampers Pakistan from playing a role as a sovereign equal, notwithstanding the difference in size.

· Three, U.S. and rest of the West, are nervous about the Islamic threat. That is why U.S. wants Pakistan to be weak enough so as not to play any effective central role in unifying the Muslim World. Muslim World has to be kept divided and subdued. For that purpose the Israeli dagger was thrust in the heart of the Arab world.Israel has been so strengthened that it should dominate the combined strength of the Arab states, militarily and economically. It has been ensured that no challenging power should emerge in the region. In Turkey, the Muslim elements are so controlled that the country, in alliance with Israel, could continue the secular agenda drastically and perpetuate US-Israel hegemony externally. Any nation that aspires for an independent role - be it Iran, Libya, Iraq, Pakistan or anyone else - is so ‘fixed’ that it may pose no threat to Israeli hegemony. The fate of Central Asian Muslim states is no different. A situation is created in the Central Asian states that they may not join Pakistan, Iran and Turkey to create a Muslim block, and this whole area remains linked with Russia and Europe. In this context, Pakistan’s becoming a nuclear power is most awesome for the West and a factor that can upset their whole future plans.

In the context of this political chessboard, it can be well-understood that in the sight of U.S., Israel and the European countries, the real danger is Pakistan’s nuclear capability and economic progress and emancipation. The Indian nuclear status somewhat fits into this design. That is why when China acquired atomic capability in 1964, Western countries including Russia, Canada, France, Israel and America helped openly as well as clandestinely to make India a nuclear power. No adverse reaction was shown against Indian detonation in 1974. Even the Indian explosions of 1998 could materialize because of sustained help of some these countries, particularly Russia and Israel. No severe action was taken against her or sanctions imposed until Pakistan conducted tests on May 28 and 30. The whole rage of sanctions is really targeted at Pakistan’s nuclear capability and economic independence. Pakistan and its nuclear deterrence are looked upon as real thorn in flesh. The weapon of economic sanctions has been applied ruthlessly even illegally for the same end. And the fact is that some of these sanctions were not enforced in June, 1998; as far as Pakistan is concerned the process rather begins from 1976 and continues in various forms and intensities. June 1998 represents only their culmination, not beginning.

Even the relaxations now being promised do not represent a change of heart - they only reflect change of strategy and tactics. The purpose is not to pull Pakistan out of the economic crisis. Some domestic compulsions are also in operation. The pressure is coming from U.S. agricultural and industrial lobbies. Yet the real objective is to keep Pakistan in a condition of perpetual dependence upon the U.S. and Europe. That its economy should remain in an economic ‘Intensive Care Unit’, getting as much ‘oxygen’ that keeps the ‘sickman’ alive, needing further supplies of oxygen.

Thus the real issue is not simple commitment to the CTBT, nor to make some arrangements for periodic bail-outs by borrowing more and more from the World Bank/IMF and other international money-lenders. The issue is Pakistan’s independent and sovereign existence, its capacity to decide its own policies in accord with its own ideals, values and priorities, and not simply play second fiddle to America. CTBT and IMF/World Bank bail outs are roads to this new servitude.

Let it be clearly understood that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not a self-contained and independent treaty. It is a key element of a comprehensive and integrated American nuclear doctrine as clarified in its preamble. If some one contends that by signing CTBT the matter would be over, it would be naive and height of short-sightedness. The purpose of the Treaty is that the five world atomic powers, and more particularly the United States, should perpetuate their nuclear hegemony over the world. The result would be that the Muslim world stays permanently deprived of this capability. The U.S. nuclear umbrella provides protecting shield to the Americans, Europe and Japan. China has its own nuclear umbrella. In Europe, UK and France have their own added deterrents. Now India has managed to secure enough capability that it can establish its hegemony over the region. The nuclear doctrine followed by India goes far into the year 2030, seeking equality with China and the power to impose its security system over rest of Asia.

Israel is a nuclear power. Yet the only area that lacks a nuclear security system, is the Muslim world. Stretching from Morocco to Malaysia, it is dependent on others for its defence. Worst is the condition of the Arabs, who inspite of enormous wealth at their command, figure nowhere by way of either conventional or nuclear defence capability. Their freedom and security hangs by a ‘thread’, which the U.S. and/or Israel can sever any moment. Under the circumstances the future of the Muslim world depends on Pakistan. That is exactly why the whole political, economic and technological pressure is exerted against Pakistan. Carrot and stick both are in use, in full measure.

After Pakistan conducted the tests in response to Indian explosions, the five permanent members of the Security Council (P-5), the eight industrially developed nations (G-8) and the UN Security Council through its resolution, have all made it sufficiently clear that Pakistan and India should commit to test bans through signing CTBT and that this should be followed by other steps:

1. Acceptance of the NPT regime;

2. Stopping further enrichment, joining the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), including acceptance of proposed inspection arrangements;

3. Submission to the Missile Technology Control and Transfer Regime, so as to contain and control delivery systems;

4. Restrain from weaponization, miniaturization and deployment of nuclear aterial; and

5. To commit not to export or supply technology, and develop appropriate Command and Control System.

The above five are components of one indivisible American nuclear doctrine. Todate Pakistan is totally out of this whole system, and inspite of all hue and cry at the international level, whatever Pakistan, or for that matter India, has done is legally and morally correct; as under international law Pakistan had every right to do so. No international treaty or convention has been violated so far. But once Pakistan signs and becomes part of the system, then it will be bound to follow all rules and may never be able to get out of it, despite the so-called existing clauses. A country once entrapped, if it opts to come out, will face the fate of Iraq and the type of threats given to North Korea.

CTBT is the first step towards this trap. Pakistan must avoid it if it wishes to protect its sovereignty and nuclear deterrence. If we do not resist this slippery road at this stage, we would wily nilly be dragged into the abyss. The five nuclear powers, particularly the U.S. is destined to play all games and exert all kinds of pressure to force Pakistan into CTBT unconditionally, followed by commitment to FMCT and stop trace of all further development of nuclear equipment and technology or deploying of missiles.. (para 3, p-5 Communique of 5th June,1998). The five have also made it abundantly clear that no amendment will be made in the NPT for the sake of the two countries to recognize their nuclear status...(para 4).

In the light of this memorandum, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution No.1172 that contains 17 clauses. Clauses 10 to 13 clearly state: Pakistan and India should immediately stop nuclear weapons development. Both must ensure that they will not set up missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to their targets, nor further enrich nuclear material, commit to nuclear non-proliferation and stop further development of the relevant technologies. That full pressure be exerted on the two countries to sign CTBT and NPT, unconditionally and without delay.

When the Prime Minister of Pakistan pledged on September 23, 1998 in the UN General Assembly to respect CTBT and accepted it practically - date unspecified - the U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright categorically declared the very next day that CTBT was not the only issue; the whole nuclear regime is to be accepted and adhered to. The U.S. Security Adviser, Sundy Berger repeated the same. U.S. Under Secretary of State, Strobe Talbot, speaking on "Peace and Security in South Asia" in the World Network Programme (November 13, 1998) again fired in the same direction. He openly stated that virtual nuclear roll-back was the real target. With respect to CTBT, for the first time he alluded to the inspection not merely of "testing sites" but of "nuclear sites". Interestingly the Treaty has used the term ‘Test’ in the title and not in the substantive text where only "explosion" is mentioned. Both these terms were not properly defined in the Treaty. Mr Talbot’s allusion to ‘nuclear sites’ is not a lapse, it has brought the cat out of the bag.

The fact that CTBT is a stepping stone to an integrated indivisible nuclear doctrine is hard to deny. The decision to be taken today is whether Pakistan is ready to be entangled in the system, and resultantly get its hand tied for ever. Alternately is it willing to pay the price to stay free and insist on maintaining its nuclear deterrence in a manner that is not only in keeping with its independence and honour but which also enables it to effectively protect its national and ideological security? If freedom, security and honour are dear to Pakistan, then it will have to decide today. Any subservience to the neo-imperialist system is not acceptable, whatever be the costs or allurements. If so, then Pakistan must look only to Allah, place confidence in its own people and follow the path of self-reliance. Any other option, whatever be the promises, the result would be drift towards a new slavery.

CTBT must not be signed because it is a component of an integrated system. If Pakistan cannot resist this first step, it will certainly get entangled in the total regime, no matter what attempts it makes to get spared. Finally, the nuclear capability will have to be frozen, restricted, reduced and abandoned. If Pakistan does not want that end result, it has to show the courage, resolve and self-confidence today, and be ready to pay the price. To claim that: "We will sign and still save our nuclear programme", is sheer self-deception.

Pakistan’s security concerns are multi-faceted. And all these aspects - military security, economic strength, ideological identity and cultural integrity - are equally important and inter-related. No doubt the first on the list is the military dimensions. Stepping into the CTBT corridor is bound to take us along the road to de-nuclearization, nothing short of national suicide. This specific aspect of the national security relates to the threat perception from India, as well as Pakistan’s role in shaping the future of the Muslim Ummah. Both these dimensions should remain in sight. In this background, Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities and their development and consolidation in future become extraordinarily important. To ensure maintenance of these capabilities, doors must remain open to further tests. Accepting ban on further nuclear tests would amount to abandoning these security dimensions and betraying the aspirations of the people of Pakistan and the Islamic Ummah.

A lobby is suggesting that Pakistan can maintain its deterrent capability even without further tests. Some respectable nuclear scientists have also made similar allusions.

With profound respect we would like to invite these learned friends to seriously reflect on what the Indian nuclear scientists have said in similar context. Instead of making political statements they have chosen to say that their role finishes where technical contributions end. The rest is the responsibility of the political leadership who alone must take decisions and be responsible for that. (Time magazine, Nov. 30, 1998, p.22)

CTBT’s non-relevance to nuclear deterrence is being trumpeted in the official media in a very biased manner and distorted. Presenting only one side of the picture is a dangerous half truth. We would like the political, intellectual, scientific and military leadership of the country to look into the issue with greater depth and greater concern for present and future needs. Only a futuristic approach can be realistic. We must not surrender to short-period political or economic pressures.

Pakistan is in an initial stage of nuclear development. Thanks God, it has acquired the basic capability and has demonstrated it successfully. This has been a blessing from Allah. All persons and institutions - scientific, military and political - certainly deserve praise and support for performing this valuable service to the nation and Ummah. It should also be acknowledged that nuclear race is neither inevitable nor desirable. Similarly equality is not necessary, as was madly pursued by the two super powers in the era of cold war. What is needed is credible nuclear deterrence, today and tomorrow. This calls for a dynamic capability keeping in view the threat perception from the adversary. Credible deterrent is essential for national security. This deterrence is not a static phenomena, it is rather dynamic and relative. The adversary’s capacity to attack and defend is the point of reference. If even Pakistan overlooks the Israeli danger (although we do not consider it wise to ignore that too), even then the Indian danger is a grim reality. India has very clearly declared its nuclear ambitions. It is a nuclear weaponized country and is not prepared to abdicate this position. Jaswant Singh’s latest exposition of the Indian nuclear paradigm in "Foreign Affairs" (Sept-Oct,1998, pp.46-51) deserves to be noted and considered by all policy analysts:

· "Today India is a nuclear weapon state" (p.46)

· "India made its nuclear decisions guided only by its national interest, always supported by a national consensus" (p.46)

· "India has moved from being moralistic to being a little more realistic, while the rest of the nuclear world has arrived at all its nuclear conclusions entirely realistically" (p.47)

· "India is the only country in the world sandwiched between two nuclear weapon powers" (p.48)

· "India, in exercise of its supreme national interests, has acted in a timely fashion to correct an imbalance and fill a dangerous vacuum. A more powerful India will help balance and connect the oil-rich Gulf region and the rapidly industrializing countries of Southeast Asia" (p.48)

· "India has brought into open the nuclear reality that had remained clandestine for at least past 11 years" (p.49)

· "India’s motives remain security, ... the tests encompassed the range of technologies necessary to make a credible deterrent" (p.49)

· "India’s nuclear policy has been marked by restraint and openness...Restraint, however, has to arise from strength. Restraint is valid only when it removes doubts, which is precisely what India’s tests did - the minimum necessary to maintain an irreducible component of country’s national security calculus" (p.51)

· "What India did in May was to assert that it is impossible to have two standards of national security - one based on nuclear deterrence and the other outside it... India still lives in a rough neibourhood. It would be a great error to assume that simply advocating the new matters of globalization and the market, makes national security subservient to global trade. The 21st Century will not be the century of trade. The world still has to address the unfinished agenda of the centuries" (p.52)

The Indian leadership has made it clear that:

(1) India is and would remain a state equipped with nuclear weapons, along with conventional weapons regime. It will maintain and develop this capability at all costs, so that it has the supremacy beyond its borders and extending upto Gulf;

(2) For the time being, India needs no more testing, but if need be, the options are open and no limitations will be accepted;

(3) Minimum deterrence does not mean mere nuclear capability; it includes proper weaponization and an effective delivery systems.

Jasit Singh, Director of Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis states clearly:

"recessed deterrence may be defined as a credible nuclear weapons capability which the country is able to draw upon for political and diplomatic purposes, and is able to deploy a nuclear arsenal within a defined time-frame and effectively use it physically for military purposes" (The News, Nov. 15, 1998, p.7)

Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpai, in a statement in the Indian Parliament, has clearly confirmed these ambitions. According to him, minimum deterrence means "the minimum capability to fight a nuclear war".

Another Indian military strategist says:

"the nuclear deterrence means capabilities to weaponise, deploy and deliver a second strike within 24 hours or so, inflicting unacceptable damage".

It also deserves to be noted that:

· India possesses at present 80 to 100 bombs in ready form;

· Has material to prepare 200 more bombs;

· It has developed reliable delivery systems via missiles, air delivery and

nuclear submarine;

· Has prepared weapons based both on Uranium and Plutonium;

· Claims that it has also conducted thermo-nuclear test, which can enable it to produce Hydrogen bombs, many times more destructive;

· Has enough Plutonium (Pu239) and also Tritium which works as instant

booster in the thermonuclear (H3) device (Hydrogen Isotope);

· Because of the great land mass, India has the strategic depth, yet it has obtained nuclear sub-marine from Russia and is busy fabricating one itself. Thus it has the ‘second-strike’ capability.

To contain such an adversary, it is necessary for Pakistan to possess not equal but competitive capability. From this view-point Pakistan does not have enough in store. The tests that Pakistan carried out are not sufficient inspite of all their success and effectiveness. To maintain sufficient deterrent power and to meet the requirements of tomorrow in the field of technology and developments on the Indian side , options of further nuclear tests must be open.

On the basis of firm advice from scientists in Pakistan and abroad, the writer is convinced that while there may not be an immediate need for further testing to confirm the weapon-grade level of Uranium (U235) enrichment, but for developing Plutonium (Pu239) and tritium the testing process is essential. Computer simulation or cold testing cannot provide results beyond a certain level of certainty. Development of precise thermo-nuclear devices would need hot testing. Hot-tests are also necessary for weaponization; miniaturization and major modifications in designs in the future, particularly to further develop weapon-designs and upgradings for target refinement and seeking reduction in radiation and hazards for human life and health. Kahuta may not be needing hot testing soon, but for Khushab on which billions of dollars have been invested, such tests are essential in the coming stages. Similarly tests have great importance in the preparation of "tactical low yield" devices. Pakistan is yet to develop Tritium, which India claims to have developed. The enemy is far ahead in this respect. Should we tie our hands and be at the mercy of the world community which has always betrayed us!

In view of the above realities we cannot agree with those who suggest that the country can face all the future nuclear challenges from an adversary who is not accepting any restraint only on the basis of Pakistan’s present nuclear capacity. This option would be too risky and dangerous. No doubt the nation must first rely upon Allah’s grace and blessing. But we must also remember that the Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) while ordering Muslims to have trust in Allah, also advised them to "keep the camel tied". The Qura’nic command is also very clear. "Make ready for an encounter against them all the forces and well-readied horses you can muster that you may overawe the enemies of Allah and your own enemies and others besides them of whom you are unaware, but of whom Allah is aware. Whatever you may spend in the cause of Allah, shall be fully repaid to you, and you shall not be wronged" (al-Anfal 8 : 60). This principle of deterrent power is a dynamic concept and must not be compromised if we want to protect our honour, faith and national security. This implies that Pakistan should not tie its own hands while India keeps its options open and all the problems that mar India-Pakistan relationship, particularly as long as the future of the millions of Muslims of Kashmir who are suffering under Indian occupation, remains unresolved. It would be height of folly to so surrender our rights.

For a number of purposes computer simulation is an option. But where are those super computers and the dual purpose technology, of which U.S. and the Western powers have todate kept Pakistan deprived. India possesses some of these super computers; has acquired the relevant advanced technology and is ensuring to get more. Pakistan in this respect is far behind. Another relevant variable is the amount of data available on the basis of own tests or soft ware based on tests by others. We do not have enough where-withal in this respect as well. Russia and the U.S. have data derived from over a thousand hot tests by each. They can update their nuclear capabilities even without further hot testing. CTBT keeps the door open for cold-testing. But unless Pakistan obtains necessary technology and data, how can it develop competitive capacity without practical testing. To have that capability and for further developing it according to needs, Pakistan has to acquire, among others, the following processes:

(i) Super computers;

(ii) Non-nuclear testing equipment of zero yield;

(iii) Fast data acquisition systems;

(iv) Linear Escalators;

(v) High Energy flash x-ray simulations; etc.

The West has established its monopoly over these advanced technologies. The doors have been kept shut for most of the third world countries. Even Pakistani scientists and students for advanced studies and research are barred from Western universities and laboratories. Let them first open all these avenues. Without that the cruel and oppressive nuclear apartheid has only divided the humanity into two permanent and distinct groups: the nuclear weapon states; and the nuclear have-nots. Can Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah accept this position of subservience? Does this position have any relevance to the Muslim’s faith, of their being "best of the nations" (khair-al-Ummam), and their role as "Witnesses of Trust upon the humanity" (shuhada alan-Nas)?

To those who advise signing CTBT, it is submitted with respect that Pakistan is to face an adversary which has many times more power, both in conventional and nuclear fields. Pakistan has been able only to create minimum deterrence. With the advent of this credible equation after the May 28 tests the chances of a war in South Asia have minimized. But, to maintain this capacity in the future and to up-grade it to the required level(s), it is necessary to keep our hands untied and to protect the capacity to counter Indian advancements. Let us learn a lesson from debates taking place in American policy-making forums about probable effects of ratification of CTBT on America’s future security and deterrent capabilities.

The U.S. is the only super power which now possesses many times more capacity in conventional and nuclear weapons against both Russia and China. It has undertaken 1045 hot-tests, and has after signing CTBT made four tests last year within the "sub-critical" limits alongwith its capacity for cold and computer simulation tests. Yet some of its top nuclear scientists have advised their government NOT to ratify CTBT. These scientists claim that no matter how supreme the present U.S. position may be, it should not accept any ban on hot-tests if it wishes to keep its upper hand and world position in future.

The U.S. President has certainly signed the Treaty, but the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives, has not even initiated considering it. The Committee’s chairman has already expressed his reservations about the Treaty. The Senate Committee is considering the issue in a leisurely manner. The testimony before the Committee of John Holum, Director Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Spurgeon Kenny, head of the Arms Control Association; and Dr Kathlean Baily, head of the Lawrence Livermore Natural Laboratory deserve to be carefully analysed. A few extracts are reproduced here for the consideration of our own intellectuals and policy-makers.

John Holum says in his testimony before Senate Sub-Committee on the occasion of Hearing on CTBT, on March 18, 1998:

"Without the ability to conduct nuclear explosive tests, nuclear weapon states will be effectively frozen at current level of weapon development".

"The United States is currently in a position to reap maximum benefits from such a freeze"

"Indeed CTBT will strengthen our means to monitor nuclear testing world-wide. It will improve our nuclear test monitoring capabilities. The CTBT augments the current national technical means for monitoring nuclear testing with additional tools and data not previously available to the United States"

"The CTBT will allow us to monitor a safe and reliable nuclear deterrent. The first safeguard mandated the control of a Stockpile Stewardship Programme to ensure high level of confidence in the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons stockpile....confirming that the U.S. will enter the CTBT regime with a powerful, well tested arsenal"

According to Director John Holum, as U.S. does not need more tests, it is time to withhold the rest of the world from tests so as to ensure permanent supremacy of the U.S.:

"What it needs is more American leadership for another tool we can use to rein in the nuclear danger"

The countries not having stockpile of nuclear arms will not be able to make arms of high quality without carrying out any test. Director John Holum says:

"It is possible to develop a simple fission device without testing and certainly that could be done. At the same time, the ability to conduct a boosted, or to develop a boosted weapon that would have + could be reduced in size and delivered in the ways I described would be much harder. I think the experts would say without testing that would very likely be an impossible task. Similarly, the ability to design a two-stage device, as thermo-nuclear device, would be a challenge beyond the reach of countries without testing".

About the computer tests, Director Holum says that China and Russia respectively have computers with a capacity of 2000 and 7000 million theoretical operations per second (or) mamtox (ph), whereas the United States possesses computers of the capacity of 100,000 mamtox (ph), which is part of the Stockpile Stewardship Programme.

Inspite of these capabilities, Dr Kathlean Baily strongly recommends that US should NOT ratify CTBT, because that may result in constraining it to maintain its upper hand in the future, and as such produce security risks. She says:

"Let me start with my conclusion, which is that CTBT fails the cost benefit test. Specifically it will not accomplish the non-proliferation goals as set out for it by the administration. And at the same time, the treaty will seriously degrade the US nuclear deterrent, and this will have a high national security cost". (Senate Sub-Committee Hearing on CTBT, Testimony III by Dr Baily, 18/3/98).

"CTBT does not constitute a step toward disarmament. This is because nuclear weapons states are not by any means abandoning nuclear deterrents, but are instead taking steps to assure that their stockpiles will remain safe and reliable, and therefore usable, despite the test ban. The U.S. Stockpile Stewardship Programme is designed to defeat nuclear erosion. It is the dependence of the nuclear weapon states on nuclear deterrent despite the NPT commitments to disarmament, that is the source of greatest damages to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

Dr. Kathlean Baily also informs that tests of less than a kiloton yield cannot possibly be monitored under this Treaty, so the tests will continue. Also, by resorting to what is called "decoupling process", the yield of a device can be lowered to one-seventieth. That is to say 10 kiloton experiment will show only 0.14 kiloton yield. With this technology ‘game’ the US will continue its tests despite CTBT. In fact, by resort to this technique, the US has already conducted tests, beginning with the December 3, 1996 test at Salt Domm.

Despite this capability Dr. Kathlean Baily recommends that US should not ratify the Treaty, why because:

"Ratifying the CTBT will foreclose the ability of the United States to modernize its nuclear forces".

Agreeing as to what a computer can do, Dr Baily observes: "virtual reality cannot replace reality". Referring to future dangers, Dr Baily advises:

"We need to maintain the flexibility to have nuclear weapons designs. There may be new threats, for example, chemical and biological. What if we need to have a nuclear weapon that would detonate and burn up the biological agent in a particular bunker? We cannot do that conventionally, we can do it nuclear. What if we needed a small tailor-made nuclear weapon to do that? We may discover new safety measures, we would need to do new designs then. Additionally, new technologies by Russia and China in terms of defending against our nuclear arsenal, our nuclear deterrent, could cause us to have to re-tailor our arsenal. We need to maintain flexibility to do that... I think we will continue to need some level of nuclear testing, not only to, if we chose to support stockpile stewardships, we need to be able to calibrate the stockpile stewardship"

This is what the scientists have to advise the U.S. policy makers, which possesses a nuclear weapons heap sufficient to destroy the whole globe 15 to 20 times. Here Pakistanis know very well what the Indian designs are, yet they feel complacent that they are and would remain "well-prepared" for any future eventuality despite cutting their hands with CTBT and all that is to follow it!

There is no denying that economic security is also necessary alongwith defence security - both are inter-related and inter-dependent. Having studied and analysed the current economic situation in Pakistan, we have no hesitation in submitting that our current economic crisis is NOT the result of sanctions imposed after the May 98 detonations. The real and substantive causes are to be found in the ill-conceived economic policies that have frustrated all progress. We have fallen behind all the developing regional economies. Saving levels are low. We are living beyond our means. Our development strategies are flawed. Our priorities have been misplaced. The economy is suffering from major deformations. Infrastructure is corroding. We have gone for the easy but futile option of living on debts we cannot pay back. Indebtedness has increased to staggering heights. The productivity of loans and investments is continuously decreasing. Inflation is rampant. Unemployment is growing, so is the black economy. Banks recovery rate is so unsatisfactory that default is close to 40 percent of their advances. The dismal situation has been emerging as part of a clear pattern since at least last 15 years. Therefore, putting all blame on the ‘sanctions’, and seeking more and more loans, would be economically disastrous and loaded with great dangers for national security. We would therefore submit that while formulating national security policy, the defence and economic security requirements should be delinked from the issue of seeking more loans from the World Bank and the IMF, and also to be dissociated from the question of economic and military sanctions. These sanctions are immoral and illegal. We must not succumb to them. They provide an opportunity to learn to live within our means and pursue the path of real self-reliance. That is the honourable way out.

Pakistan initiated its nuclear programme knowing well that sanctions will come. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto went ahead with it even after having received open threats from Dr.Henry Kissinger. General Ziaul Haq brushed aside sanctions imposed by President Jimmy Carter and continued with the programme. Ghulam Ishaq Khan faced all the pressures but did not budge an inch. The army, the scientists and the patriotic political forces stood firm to save the programme. It is a blessing from Allah that Pakistan has become the first ever Muslim nuclear state. Now to stop or roll-back this programme at the price of lifting the sanctions or getting a few billions in the form of new loans will be an act of betrayal, not to be tolerated by the nation.

Let us repeat. The US pressure is not directed simply and merely to sign the CTBT. The aim is to set Pakistan along road to de-nuclearization and its marginalization in world politics. Granted that the country is hard hit economically, but the pressure should not result in submission at the nuclear front, because that will be suicidal. We believe that if fundamental reforms are not introduced in the economic system, then lifting of sanctions and securing more loans will make no real difference. Rather Pakistan will be further deeply submerged in this quagmire. Presently, Pakistan is begging for 4 to 5 billion dollars. Next year the gap would call for $ 6 to 7 billions, and third year it may reach $10 billions. Present external indebtedness, while taking all liabilities together, stands at 43 billion dollars, will soar to 60-70 billion dollars within a couple of years. This would be a threat to national freedom, security and honour.

We, therefore, warn the nation to be watchful in respect to the Prime Minister’s Washington visit. There must not be any surrender on CTBT and nuclear deterrence. Freedom, honour and national security come first and foremost. No one has any mandate to compromise on them.

For the sake of record let us also recall that the Muslim League manifesto, as also of the PPP, pledged not to compromise on nuclear capabilities. Muslim League Manifesto (1997) says:

"Pakistan Muslim League, being the country’s founding party will formulate a foreign policy that will reflect national aspirations and will be characterised by strong defence, dynamic economy and popular confidence...

Muslim League will accord top priority to enhance the defence capabilities of the Pak army, so that Pakistan’s regional security is strengthened, and an effective role played in creating and supporting a sense of protection and peace...

Muslim League believes in nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, and totally rejects any reduction in the country’s nuclear capability or some biased and one-sided ban."

Peoples Party also promised in its election manifesto (1997):

"Will continue acquiring new weapons for immediate needs. Equip the army with most modern weapons. Will not sign NPT. Nuclear technology will be for peaceful purposes."

All political parties pledged in every election after 1985 not to compromise on the nuclear issue, and that is the true national mandate.

The present government initiated debate on CTBT in a joint session of the Parliament. What emerged from the debate was that the nation does not favour the CTBT. In this background, the Prime Minister has only one option. He should clearly tell the U.S. leadership that there will be no compromise on the nuclear issue. The economic sanctions are unjustified and ways and means could be discussed for lifting the ban, but all this will be without any reference to or agreement upon containing nuclear capabilities. CTBT and other related treaties cannot be considered without first fully meeting Pakistan’s security requirements and giving due regard to the interests of Muslim Ummah. The frame-work within which talks could be held, is:

(1) Permanent monopoly of a few countries over the nuclear capability is unjust and unacceptable: Either every one should have it or none allowed. If the big powers insist to maintain this monopoly sheerly at the strength of their muscles, then reaction is a must, and that is what is happening. Pakistan will never agree to this nuclear apartheid;

(2) The question of nuclear capability should be de-linked from economic sanctions. Talks can be held on fair economic cooperation, trade and investment. But without any quid pro quo respecting nuclear capability or accepting CTBT, NPT, FMCT (fissile material cut off treaty) or MTCR (missile technology control regime);

(3) Like India, Pakistan is a "nuclear weapon state" (NWS), and the world has to accept this fact. Unless NPT is suitably amended (i.e. extend the 1967 cut-off date), the dialogue will not move an inch. Pakistan will never accept degradation from nuclear capable status to non-nuclear status.

(4) Whether at the international or regional level, Pakistan is ready to talk about nuclear disarmament and to establish a new healthy system. But that is possible only if there is no duress and no discrimination, particularly between India and Pakistan. Also real progress must be ensured in respect of the core dispute between India and Pakistan i.e. Kashmir.

(5) An essential pre-requisite of (4) above is to seek solution to the problems of South Asia which have mainly been created because of Indian regional ambitions and capacities for aggression. That is why an acceptable balance of power between Pakistan and India is crucial. No special treatment be given to India anymore. The privileges available to her now or in the future should also be available to the second nuclear power of the region, i.e. Pakistan. This includes permanent seat at the UN Security Council, transfer of technology and availability of all other concessions and arrangements. Similarly, matters could be discussed with India relating to conventional weapons as well as fissile material enrichment, nuclear tests, missiles, nuclear weaponization and their deployment within the framework of reasonable balance of power and credible deterrence. But no one-way sanctions or discrimination is acceptable. In all these matters clear ‘linkage’ with India is natural and never to be compromised. If India ever goes for new test(s), or upsets the balance of power, then Pakistan has the right to correct that balance. The only ‘de-linking’ possible is, that if India signs all treaties, but the most basic issue between Pakistan and India - deciding the future of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with UN resolutions - remains unsolved, then Pakistan should not accept any restriction under the said nuclear arrangement, even after Indian signatures;

(6) In the light of (5) above, a decisive and important component of the framework is the just solution of Kashmir problem, which should be according to the UN resolutions and on the basis of the free will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Other issues are also important, but Kashmir provides key for the rest. The fifty years of useless talks indicate that holding bi-lateral talks will not be sufficient. This is also evident from statement in the latest talks held in New Delhi. The world powers and UN have to become active and the Kashmir freedom movement has to be given a status similar to that of other movements for self-determination. Kashmiris have to participate in these talks and the problem solved within a given time frame. Without this neither the regional peace is possible, nor the potential for South Asian economic and human development can be realized. If the ground realities and demands of justice are overlooked, true peace will never materialize.

This is the six-point agenda which promises solution to the South Asian problems. Talks could be held with U.S. and India and with the support of the Pakistani nation, strategy can be worked out for regional reconstruction, but within the suggested frame work. No other way would be acceptable to the nation, nor any headway will be possible otherwise. Do meet President Clinton, Mr Prime Minister! but take a strong stand with due courage and wisdom and do not budge an inch from it, as this is in the best security interests of the Pakistani nation and the Muslim Ummah. Get rid of the slavery of loans. Really break the beggar’s bowl and break it for good. Protect the nuclear capability at all cost for the sake of national freedom and security. This is the only path of life and honour. If this path is abandoned and any weakness shown, then the nation, which has a high sense of honour, will not tolerate it. The US should also understand that any treaty thrust against the wishes and resolve of the nation will carry no weight and little respect.

[This is an ADAPTATION of Tarjumanul Quran Isharat of Dec 1998, (written Originally in Urdu) by Prof Khurshid Ahmad.]

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